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Mining sector investments in Africa can be structured so 
that the continent may benefit from climate policy in de-
veloped countries that puts a global price on carbon. Cur-
rent supply chains rely on complex, specialized networks 
where different parts of the production process are locat-
ed in different regions of the world. This system of global 
value chains5 leads to greenhouse gas emissions through 
cross-border transportation and excess waste (especially 
in electronics and plastics). There is some evidence that 
border tariffs harm vertical specialization, where different 
regions are specialized in a very specific task.6 Therefore, 
carbon pricing, including carbon border tax, could lead to 
the localization of value chains. Multinational companies 
may move intermediate stages of production closer to the 
source of mineral extraction, providing a boost to foreign 
investment across Africa. The incentive for companies to 
shrink these value chains is even higher in the aftermath of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed some of the risks 
of relying on extensive global supply networks.7 These 
global trends sit within a broader and relatively recent 
context of soaring environment, social, and governance 
(ESG) investment affecting companies, shareholders, and 
governments alike.   
1 CCSI, Head: Mining and Energy
2 CCSI, Senior Legal and Economics Researcher.
3 MIT PhD Student; previously CCSI, Research Assistant.
4 Non-Executive Director of the Board of AngloGold Ashanti Group and 
Chair of the Board’s Social, Ethics and Sustainability Committee. 
Previously Chief of the Climate Change, Environment and Natural 
Resources Section at the UNECA and Coordinator of the African 
Mineral Resources Development Centre (AMDC), a dedicated insti-
tution established to implement the African Union’s flagship pro-
gram, the Africa Mining Vision (AMV). The views expressed in this 
paper is personal and cannot be attributed to any of Kojo Busia’s 
current or previous institutional affiliation. 
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development et al., 
World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 
2013), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/
wir2013_en.pdf.  
6 Kei-Mu Yi, “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World 
Trade?” Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 1 (February 2003): 52-
102, doi:10.1086/344805. 
7 Jason Sappor, Thomas Rutland, Gregory Rodwell, Ronnie 
Cecil, Alice Yu, and Luke Nickels, “COVID-19 Impacts to 
Metals Prices - The End of the Beginning,” S&P Global 
Market Intelligence (May 11, 2020), https://www.spglob-
al .com/market intel l igence/en/ne ws - insights/research/
covid-19-impacts-to-metals-prices-the-end-of-the-beginning. 
The 2009 Africa Mining Vision (AMV)8 provides guidance 
for the industrialization of African countries by leverag-
ing their mining sector. However, the global context has 
changed since its crafting and, consequentially, it does 
not include guidance on how governments should em-
brace the climate change agenda as an opportunity for 
better and further industrialization, deeper linkages, and 
sustainable development. Its neglect of climate change 
does not mean that the AMV is no longer relevant. On the 
contrary, its focus on skills and technology development is 
more important than ever to seize the opportunity of the 
localization of the global value chains, a trend that is still 
weak in many jurisdictions where critical minerals for the 
energy transition are produced. Moreover, the AMV’s focus 
on harmonizing mineral policies across sub-regional blocs 
and the continent would also serve countries well, given 
that the global energy transition would be determined not 
so much by national endowments of critical resources, but 
by the regional and continental dynamics of technology, 
skills, and governance systems.   
There are many ways to look at the implications of interna-
tional climate change policy for Africa, including through 
the increased extraction of minerals needed in clean en-
ergy application9 and the greening of mines.10 The local-
ization of global value chains—induced by a rising carbon 
cost and by the desire to build resilience in supply chains 
in light of increased pandemic risks—provides another 
set of opportunities. Seizing this momentum will require 
policy guidance to ensure that the relocation of industries 
in global value chains occurs upstream (closer to mineral 
sources) rather than downstream (closer to final consum-
ers). An open acknowledgment of the impact of climate 
change on the shifting global value chains for critical min-
erals and the need to broaden the governance framework 
to include the emerging role of sustainability and ESG re-
quirements should form the foundation for a revised and 
revitalized AMV.
8 Africa Mining Vision  (African Union, 2009), https://au.int/sites/
default/files/documents/30984-doc-africa_mining_vision_english.
pdf.
9 Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Solina Kennedy, and 
Howard Mann, Don’t Throw Caution to the Wind: In the Green Energy 
Transition, Not All Critical Minerals Will Be Goldmines (Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment, 2020). https://scholarship.law.
columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/7. 
10 Nicolas Maennling and Perrine Toledano, The Renewable Power 
of the Mine: Accelerating Renewable Energy Integration (New York: 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2018), https://schol-
arship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/77. 
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Evidence for rising carbon prices and its effect on 
value chain localization
There are currently 64 regional carbon pricing initiatives, 
covering over 22% of global emissions,11 up from 16 initia-
tives covering less than 5% of emissions since the AMV was 
adopted in 2009. The largest scheme so far, by revenue, is 
the European Union’s (EU) internal cap-and-trade system, 
the Emissions Trading System (ETS) but other countries 
and sub-national regions are following suit.12 China, for 
instance has made forward moves towards carbon prices, 
working on draft regulations, conducting regional pilots, 
and implementation a national cap-and-trade system 
starting trading this year.13 Carbon prices and the scope of 
the carbon pricing schemes are on the rise everywhere and 
in particular in Asia. The EU ETS has undergone reforms 
that stabilized its carbon price at USD 27/CO2e in 2019; it 
might be further reformed this year in the context of the 
EU’s commitment to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.14 
Despite these increases in carbon prices globally, some 
policymakers continue to object to them due to their ef-
fects on domestic competitiveness. To address this, a 
key component of the EU Commission’s new agenda is a 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM); the Com-
mission submitted the idea to public consultation and 
plans to adopt a proposal for an EU directive in the sec-
ond quarter of 2021.15 The CBAM would impose a tariff on 
any product imported from a country without a carbon 
pricing plan.
11 “Carbon Pricing Dashboard,” The World Bank (website), The World 
Bank, https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org.
12 Patrick Bayer and Michaël Aklin, “The European Union Emissions 
Trading System Reduced CO2 Emissions Despite Low Prices,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 16  (April 
2020): 8804-8812,  doi:10.1073/pnas.1918128117. 
13 Reuters Staff, “China’s National Emissions Trading May Launch in 
Mid-2021 - Securities Times,” Reuters, January 11, 2021, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-china-climatechange-ets-idUSKBN29G083. 
14 World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/33809/9781464815867.pdf.  
15 Bentley B. Allan, “The E.U.’s Looking at a ‘Carbon Border Tax.’ 
What’s A Carbon Border Tax?”  The Washington Post, October 23, 
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/23/
eus-looking-carbon-border-tax-whats-carbon-border-tax; 
“EU Green Deal (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism),” 
European Commission (website), European Commission, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/
initiatives/12228-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism. 
Given that freight transportation accounts for 7% of the 
global CO2 emissions, and the total CO2 emissions from 
freight transportation are estimated to quadruple by 
2050,16 there is a strong incentive for regulators to include 
the carbon cost of transportation, packaging, and waste 
in the final product carbon footprint that is subject to tax. 
While the complexity of carbon accounting along the value 
chain complicates its implementation,17 game theory re-
search suggests that even the threat of border taxes could 
lead to a waterfall effect with other nations applying and 
increasing domestic carbon prices, so that they capture 
the revenue domestically.18 Moreover, research is already 
on the way to harmonizing carbon accounting methods.19 
In light of these developments, a border-adjusted carbon 
tax system, accompanied by an increase in global carbon 
prices, can fundamentally reshape global value chains.
Companies have been serious about reducing the emis-
sions in their operations in response to the threat of ris-
ing carbon costs. Some companies, like Apple, Microsoft, 
Shell, and Volvo, have decided to reduce emissions from 
their entire supply chains, not just their own direct emis-
sions. Apple’s carbon neutrality pledge puts specific em-
phasis on reducing the emissions in their materials supply 
chain.20  More than 1,200 companies worldwide are either 
16 World Bank, World Development Report 2020: Trading for 
Development in the Age of Global Value Chains (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/
wdr2020. 
17 Samuel Kortum and David Weisbach, “The Design of Border 
Adjustments for Carbon Prices,” National Tax Journal 70, no. 2 
(2017): 421–446, https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2017.2.07; Oliver 
Schenker, Simon Koesler, and Andreas Löschel, “Taxing Carbon 
along the Value Chain. A WIOD CGE Application” (2012), http://
www.wiod.org/conferences/groningen/slides/Schenker_slides.
pdf; Tomasz Koźluk and Christina Timiliotis, “Do Environmental 
Policies Affect Global Value Chains?,” OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 1282, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), https://
doi.org/10.1787/5JM2HH7NF3WD-EN. 
18 Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn, and Giovanni Ruta, “Trade, 
Climate Change, and The Political Game Theory of Border Carbon 
Adjustments,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28, no. 2 (Summer 
2012): 368–394, doi:10.1093/oxrep/grs013. 
19 The Coalition on Materials Emissions Transparency (COMET) aims 
to provide visibility into supply chain emissions of materials indus-
tries, including aluminum, cement, copper, iron ore and steel, and 
plastics. See “The Coalition on Materials Emissions Transparency 
(COMET),” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
(website), CCSI, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/
the-coalition-on-materials-emissions-transparency-comet.
20 Apple’s carbon neutral pledge puts spotlight on metals. Ellie 
Saklatvala, “Apple’s Carbon Neutral Pledge Puts Spotlight on 
Metals,” Argus, July 22, 2020, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/
news/2125291-apples-carbon-neutral-pledge-puts-spotlight-on-
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pursuing internal carbon pricing or preparing to do so.21 
Notably, BP has recently revised its carbon prices for the 
period to 2050, and these now include a price of US$ 100/
tCO2e in 2030.
22 More than 2,000 companies have joined 
“We Are Still In,” a group of businesses, cities, states and 
universities that commit to the Paris Agreement. Together, 
they compose half of the U.S. carbon emissions and rep-
resent 68% of U.S. GDP as well as 65% of the U.S. popu-
lation.23 Self-interest is one contributing factor furthering 
this movement: climate change constitutes a real ESG risk 
to the operations of these large companies. In January 
2020, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the largest asset 
manager in the world, declared that “climate risk is invest-
ment risk”24 Climate Action 100+, a nonprofit group of over 
300 large investors, helped persuade three of the world’s 
largest mining and steel companies, ArcelorMittal, Thys-
senkrupp and BHP, to commit to becoming carbon neutral 
by 2050.25 As of February 2021, nearly 80 global companies 
have pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.26 The sig-
nificantly increased focus from global capital and financial 
markets on climate- and ESG-related issues tends to in-
duce structural changes in many productive sectors, par-
ticularly affecting mining and energy investments in Africa 
metals; Apple, Environmental Progress Report: Covering Fiscal Year 
2019 (Apple, 2020), https://www.apple.com/environment/pdf/
Apple_Environmental_Progress_Report_2020.pdf. 
21 “Internal Carbon Pricing,” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 
(website), Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, https://www.
c2es.org/content/internal-carbon-pricing.  
22 BP, “Progressing Strategy Development, BP Revises Long-Term 
Price Assumptions, Reviews Intangible Assets and, as a Result, 
Expects Non-Cash Impairments and Write-Offs,” June 15, 2020, 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/
press-releases/bp-revises-long-term-price-assumptions.html. 
23 Rebecca Henderson, “The Unlikely Environmentalists: How the 
Private Sector Can Combat Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs 999, 
no. 3 (May/June 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
world/2020-04-13/unlikely-environmentalists. 
24 Larry Fink, “Larry Fink’s Letter to CEOs,” BlackRock, BlackRock, Inc, 
2021,  https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/
larry-fink-ceo-letter.  
25 Climate Action 100+, Asia Investor Group on Climate Change, 
Ceres, Principles for Responsible Investment, Investor Group on 
Climate Change, and The Institutional Investors Group on Climate 
Change, “Climate Action 100+ Investors Seek Net Zero Business 
Strategies Through Company Engagement,” October 2019, https://
www.iigcc.org/media/2019/10/Press-release-for-CA100-progress-
report-300919.pdf. 
26 Grace Melville, “Following the UK Government’s Announcement 
to Be Net Zero by 2050 Many Businesses Have Set Their own 
Ambitious Targets to Tackle Climate Change,” Carbon Intelligence, 
Carbon Credentials Energy Services Limited, February 5, 2021. 
https://carbon.ci/insights/companies-with-net-zero-targets. 
that are connected to global supply chains.27  
Moreover, there is not much evidence in literature to sup-
port the argument that companies are looking to avoid 
carbon taxes by moving their operations to less regulated 
countries. Several research projects, including by the World 
Bank,28 conclude that carbon costs do not lead to the ex-
ploitation of carbon havens, suggesting that multination-
als will take the rise in carbon cost seriously. They should 
further adapt their production process, including reducing 
the carbon bill coming from the reliance on transportation 
to freight intermediate products from site to another. Ev-
idence from Chile already demonstrates how large emis-
sions reductions can be achieved through the localization 
of the copper value chain.29 Multinationals are therefore 
likely to consider supply chain localization in response to 
the pressure to reduce their upstream emissions. This lo-
calization trend will be amplified as companies respond 
to COVID-19, as noted by the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development.30 
27 Lindsay Delevingne, Will Glazener, Liesbet Grégoir, and Kimberly 
Henderson, “Climate Risk and Decarbonization: What Every Mining 




28 Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, Report of the High-Level 
Commission on Carbon Pricing and Competitiveness (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2019), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/32419; Ben McWilliams and Georg Zachmann, A 
European Carbon Border Tax: Much Pain, Little Gain (Bruegel, 2020), 
https://www.bruegel.org/2020/03/a-european-carbon-border-
tax-much-pain-little-gain; Warwick J. Mckibbin, Adele C. Morris, 
Peter J. Wilcoxen, and Weifeng Liu, “The Role Of Border Carbon 
Adjustments In A U.S. Carbon Tax,” Climate Change Ecomonics 
9, no. 1 (2018), doi:10.1142/S2010007818400110; Helene Naegele 
and Aleksandar Zaklan, “Does the EU ETS Cause Carbon 
Leakage in European Manufacturing?” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 93, (2019): 125-147, doi:10.1016/j.
jeem.2018.11.004; Antoine Dechezleprêtre and Misato Sato, “The 
Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness,” 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 11, no. 2 (Summer 
2017), doi:10.1093/reep/rex013.
29 Gino Sturla-Zerene, Eugenio Figueroa B., Massimiliano Sturla, 
“Reducing GHG Global Emissions from Copper Refining 
and Sea Shipping of Chile’s Mining Exports: A World Win-
Win Policy,” Resources Policy 65 (March 2020), doi:10.1016/j.
resourpol.2019.101565. 
30 The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and 
Sustainable Development (IFG), Isabelle Ramdoo, “The Impact of 
Covid-19 On Employment In Mining,” Covid-19 Response Series 
(Ottawa: International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), 2020), https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/
covid-19-employment-mining-en.pdf. 
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There is a need for research on how Africa can 
make the most of this trend
Africa is a major source of many minerals that are likely 
to face large demand growth in the future, especially in 
the clean energy sector. The World Bank’s Climate-Smart 
Mining report published in 2020 claims that the green 
transition will be mineral intensive and that the demand 
for graphite, cobalt, and lithium may increase by 500% 
by 2050. A large proportion of these minerals are found in 
many African countries such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (cobalt), Gabon (manganese), Madagascar (graph-
ite), Zambia (copper), and Zimbabwe (lithium).31 The local-
ization of mineral-based global value chains presents an 
opportunity for Africa to industrialize. There is some evi-
dence supporting a high localization potential in Africa for 
solar photovoltaic and wind energy value chains, given the 
right conditions.32 
Despite these reasons to believe that there might be op-
portunities for Africa arising from increases in carbon pric-
es, there is limited knowledge about the effects of carbon 
costs on supply chain localization. There are also gaps in 
knowledge about how likely it is for Africa to benefit from 
this shift and which industries have high localization po-
tential in Africa. Filling these knowledge gaps is crucial to 
developing an updated industrialization plan for Africa. 
Moreover, there is a need to understand roles that stake-
holders can play that the AMV had not envisaged. For the 
longest time possible, mineral resource governance in Afri-
ca has played out within the arena of public sector institu-
tions and private companies negotiating concessions for 
resource exploitation and management. Little attention 
has been paid to the role of company boards, sharehold-
ers, and private sector regulators (such as the stock market 
31 Kirsten Hund, Daniele La Porta, Thao P. Fabregas, Tim Laing, and 
John Drexhage, Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity 
of the Clean Energy Transition (World Bank, 2020), http://pubdocs.
worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-
Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf. 
32 Department of Energy of the Republic of South Africa, “Integrated 
Energy Plan,” Staatskoerant, November 25, 2016, http://www.
energy.gov.za/files/IEP/2016/Integrated-Energy-Plan-Report.
pdf; Zaid S. AlOtaibi, Hussam I. Khonkar, Ahmed O. AlAmoudi, 
and Saad H. Alqahtani, “Current Status and Future Perspectives 
for Localizing The Solar Photovoltaic Industry in The Kingdom 
Of Saudi Arabia,” Energy Transitions 4, no. 1 (June 2020); 1-9, 
doi:10.1007/s41825-019-00020-y; Thomas Hebo Larsen and 
Ulrich Elmer Hansen, “Sustainable Industrialization in Africa: The 
Localization of Wind-Turbine Component Production in South 
Africa” Innovation and Development (January 27, 2020), doi:10.10
80/2157930x.2020.1720937. 
regulators), whose interests, often wrongfully, are equated 
with those of the corporate entity in the forefront of attain-
ing sustainable mining. Moreover, impact investing capital 
allocated  to solving sustainable challenges is on the rise 
too.33 Climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 
ESG wave have catalyzed a new set of investor actions (to 
which board of directors should be accountable to) that 
can positively and directly impact people and planet.  
To inform the update of the AMV or African’s industrial-
ization policies in general, extensive consultations must 
be undertaken with boards of directors and strategists at 
mining companies and along their value chains, operation 
managers in Africa, institutional investors, industrialization 
and business development experts, as well as with inter-
national institutions accompanying policy developments 
in Africa, such as UNECA, UNIDO, AfDB and AU. CCSI’s view 
is that research on four fronts should serve as the basis for 
a climate-smart update of the AMV:
1. Understanding the extent to which the rise in carbon 
costs, the COVID-19 crisis, and the rising pressure of 
institutional investors has already reshaped and may 
reshape global value chains.
2. Identifying the extent to which Africa is well-posi-
tioned to take advantage of any trends toward region-
alization of minerals-based global value chains.
3. Providing policy recommendations to governments, 
the mining industry, directing boards, and institu-
tional investors in Africa to help maximize the benefit 
from trends resulting from climate policy by support-
ing the participation of African countries in the global 
supply chains of critical minerals, thus contributing to 
achieving SDGs and the AMV.
4. Fostering a new governance framework that engages 
all stakeholders—comprising governments, mining 
companies, mining company boards, shareholders, 
impact investors, and affected communities—in a 
constructive dialogue to create sustainable supply 
chains adaptable to shifting ESG-related demands.  
33 Yasemin Saltuk Lamy, Christina Leijonhufvud, and Nick 
O’Donohoe, “The Next 10 Years of Impact Investment,” Stanford 
Social Innovation Review (March 2021), https://ssir.org/articles/
entry/the_next_10_years_of_impact_investment.
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